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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
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Remarks:

Ref our telephone conversation this morning.

Hand Carry

OCI - } comments hand carried

ONE - } to CI/ICD - 15 July 59

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14 July 1959

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)**SUBJECT : OCI Comments on "Assessment of the Threat of Communist Subversion in the Baghdad Pact Area: US Submission," dated 1 July 1959**

1. This paper appears to be in line with current intelligence regarding the Baghdad Pact area and a generally valid statement of the Communist subversive threat to the individual countries involved. A few specific suggestions are made in subsequent paragraphs.

3. On page 9, lines 1 and 2: The statement on the "Bakdash-led Communist Party of the Middle East" might be removed. We do not accept such a development.

4. On page 11, paragraph 2, the first sentence might be changed to read, "In sum, the Communist Party drive for power in Iraq appears at the moment to have slowed down appreciably" rather than "brought at least to a temporary halt."

50X1

Chief, Asia Africa Division
Office of Current Intelligence

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SA/DDI - Mr. Komer

14 July 1959

ONE/NE -

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Comments on Assessment of the Threat of Communist Subversion in the
Baghdad Pact Area.

1. I have no serious quarrels with this paper--which seems to me better done than previous jobs in this series. There are certain things I would write differently in an NIE, for example, but that would be for a different audience and purpose. I fully agree with the principal conclusion that Iraq and Soviet relations with the UAR represent the two most likely areas in which to judge Soviet and Communist tactics in next six months. I would add Iran to the sensitive list.

2. Minor Comments:

- a) page 2, last sentence of Section II: This overstates the case. The actions mentioned have helped to bring home the true nature of Sino-Soviet aims in many circles, but the object lesson has not been so completely and widely learned as this indicates, either in South Asia or the Arab world.
- b) page 11, top paragraph: This should be brought up to date. Cabinet reorganization has been effected as of 13 July; though as of today we still don't have a good line on the meaning of the changes. Should soon.
- c) page 14, middle paragraph, penultimate sentence: Something askew with the arithmetic as between this sentence and preceding one.
- d) page 19, final sentence: Totally unclear

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